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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
officer. This conditional privilege would protect him as long as
his remarks are made on reasonable grounds. However, the whole
policy behind executive immunity is to allow the officer freedom of
action so that he will not be called to account for his every word.
It may be in the public interest to extend absolute immunity to
officers with investigative duties, in order to prevent the suppres-
sion of important information. As executive immunity is a crea-
tion of the courts, it is their delicate task to balance these various
considerations of personal freedom and public security.
Frank J. Laski
TORTS-UNEMANCIPATED MINOR ALLOWED TORT
ACTION AGAINST PARENT FOR NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff, an unemancipated minor child, sought damages for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of a partnership of
which plaintiff's father was a member. Held: A parent in his
business or vocational capacity is not immune from a personal
tort action by his unemancipated minor child. Signs v. Signs, 156
Ohio 566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (1952).
Various reasons have been assigned for disallowing tort ac-
tions between parent and minor child. The majority of American
courts which have denied the action have relied heavily on an
analogy to the policy considerations behind the common law
inter-spouse immunity, i. e., that such an action would disrupt the
peace and harmony of the home. Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div.
651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (3rd Dep't 1930) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131,
131 Atl. 198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787
(1929); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations,
13 H_Anv. L. REv. 1030 (1930); PROSSER, TORTS 901-3 (1941).
Other reasons advanced for denying the action are that such suits
would: (1) impair parental discipline, Matarese v. Matarese,
supra, Buchanon v. Buchanon, 170 Va. 458, 197 S. E. 426 (1938);
(2) deplete the family finances, Small v. Morrison, supra; Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) ; (3) encourage fraudu-
lent and collusive suits, Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E.
2d 438 (1938).
However, where there exists a relationship additional to that
of parent and child and the fact of parenthood is, under the cir-
cumstances, merely incidental, the minor has been permitted to
maintain the action. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905
(1930). Thus recovery has been allowed where the parties are
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in the relation of master and servant, Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, or
carrier and passenger, Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d
343 (1939); Lusk v. Dusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
Also involved in these cases is the fact that the defendantis usually
protected by liability insurance. The courts have recognized that
while insurance cannot create a cause of action, it may vitiate the.
reasons for the rule granting immunity. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra
at 367, 150 Atl. at 912; Lusk v. Lusk, supra at 19, 166 S. E. at 538;
Worrell v. Worrell, supra at 27, 4 S. E. 2d at 350; cf. Elias v.
Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. IV. 88 (1926) ; Laseoki v. Kabara, 235
Wis. 645, 294 N. W. 33 (1940).
There also is a strong inclination in favor of allowing the
action where the injury or death was caused by an intentional or
malicious tort. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 Pac. 2d 445
(1950); Mahnke v. Moore, - Md. , 77 A. 2d 923(1951);
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901);
of. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d 236 (1924).
Furthermore, the courts seem to have disregarded the im-
munity and allowed an action between parent and child in matters
concerning property, Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26
(1895); Myers v. Myers, 47 'W. Va. 487, 35 S. E. 860 (1900);
Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 Atl. 292 (1925), and in the
case of a minor but emancipated child, Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn.
280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948); Crosby v. Crosby, supra.
Even though the New York Legislature eliminated the inter-
spouse immunity in 1937, (Do-rMsTic RLATioxS LA-w §57); the
courts of this state have adhered to the rule of non-liability in
the case of parent and child. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425,
40 N. E. 2d 236 (1942); see dissent in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,
248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928). However, in Rozell v.. Rozell,
281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254 (1939), which involved an action
by an unemancipated minor brother against an unemancipated
minor sister, the court intimated that various social changes
have invalidated the reasons for the rule denying liability. Never-
theless, in Cannon v. Cannon, supra, the court ruled that an action
involving a parent and minor child was not maintainable where
wilful misconduct of the parent was not a factor.
The Ohio Court has added to the expanding list of exceptions
to the rule of non-liability of a parent for a tort action by an un-
emancipated minor child. If there ever was any justification for
the immunity doctrine, such justification has now disappeared, at
least in situations in which the tort arises out of circumstances
not incident to the administration of parental duties.
Irwin.N. Davis
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
WILLS--LIFE INSURANCE SUFFICIENT SETTLEMENT
UNDER DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 26
Deceased executed a will three years prior to the birth of his
second daughter, the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff was
neither mentioned nor provided for in the will but was sub-
sequently made a co-beneficiary of several life insurance policies.
She seeks to take her intestate share as against the will under
New York Decedent Estate Law §26. Held: (3-2) The child has
no right to take against the will. Proceeds from life insurance
policies provided by the testator are within the definition of
"settlement" as used in §26. In re Faber's Will, 280 App. Div.
394, 144 N. Y. S. 2d 119 (4th Dept. 1952).
DECEDENT ESTATE L&w §26 reads: "Whenever a testator shall
have a child born after the making of a last will, either in the
lifetime or after the death of such testator, and shall die leaving
such child, so after-born, unprovided for by any settlement and
neither provided for nor in any way mentioned in such will, every
such child shall succeed to the same portion of such parent's real
and personal estate as would have descended or have been dis-
tributed to such child, if such parent had died intestate "
The civil law principle which nullifies a will made prior to the
birth of a child was in part adopted by this section. Tarshanjian
v. Abbot, 200 N. Y. 378, 93 N. E. 978 (1911). Such section par-
tially revokes a will to the extent of the child's intestate share.
Matter of Murphy, 144 N. Y. 562, 36 N. E. 691 (1895); Matter of
Kraston, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (Surr. Ct. 1945). The purpose of this
section is to protect after-born children from oversight on the part
of the testator in the disposition of his estate. McLean v. McLean,
207 N. Y. 371, 101 N. E. 178 (1913).
The problem which faced the court in the instant case is what
constitutes "any settlement" under this section. The majority
felt that where a testator has named the child joint beneficiary to
a "substantial" amount in life insurance policies, that it could not
be said that testator lacked the intention to make a "settlement".
This position exemplifies the broad interpretation of the word
"settlement". Under this interpretation a settlement need notbe of any particular kind, Matter of Froeb, 143 Misc. 660, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 850 (Surr. Ct. 1932), nor does it need to be adequate.
Matter of Kraston, supra. The following have been held to con-
stitute a "settlement": (Child's savings of $7.13 put in trust as
against an estate of over $140,000). In re Griffin's Will, 159 Misc.
12, 287 N. Y. Supp. 514 (Surr. Ct. 1936). (Two children made
beneficiaries of policies of life insurance, savings bank trust
accounts, and United States savings bonds in the aggregate sum
of $7,469.51 and $7,128.22). In re Stone's Will, 200 Misc. 639,
